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Abstract: Risk and uncertainty in rice farming create more possibility for farmers to lose their 
profit, which results in the vulnerability of continuing their farming. As noted, rice is the main 
staple food for Indonesian, and it determines the food security significantly. The aims of the 
study are to identify rice farmers’ acceptance to agricultural insurance, to analyze the factors 
affecting rice farmers’ acceptability for agricultural insurance, and to estimate rice farmers’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for agricultural insurance. The analyses include descriptive statistics 
depicting the respondents’ characteristics, logistic analysis of the factors affecting the acceptance 
of agricultural insurance, and the farmers’ willingness to pay premium regarding the government 
program of agricultural insurance for rice farmers. The results show that 80% of the randomly-
selected 50 farmer respondents accept the agricultural insurance. The positive factors affecting 
the acceptance of agricultural insurance are experience in rice farming and income from rice 
farming. Other factors considered in the logistic model are not statistically significant. Those 
factors are farmers’ age, education, income from rice farming, experience of rice farming, land 
size of rice production, the family size, and the experience of accessing any other previous 
insurance. Additionally, the rice farmers’ willingness to pay the premium of agricultural insurance 
on average is IDR35,113 per hectare. This amount is obtained from the 40 respondents who 
accept the agricultural insurance program from the government.
Keywords: agricultural insurance, premium, willingness to pay, logistic analysis, descriptive 
statistics
Abstrak: Risiko dan ketidakpastian dalam pertanian padi menciptakan lebih banyak 
kemungkinan bagi para petani untuk kehilangan keuntungan mereka, yang menghasilkan 
kerentanan melanjutkan pertanian mereka. Sebagaimana dicatat, beras adalah makanan pokok 
utama bagi orang Indonesia, dan ini menentukan ketahanan pangan secara signifikan. Tujuan 
dari penelitian ini adalah mengidentifikasi penerimaan petani padi terhadap asuransi pertanian, 
untuk menganalisis faktor-faktor yang memengaruhi penerimaan petani padi untuk asuransi 
pertanian, dan untuk memperkirakan keinginan petani padi untuk membayar (WTP) untuk 
asuransi pertanian. Analisis meliputi statistik deskriptif yang menggambarkan karakteristik 
responden, analisis logistik dari faktor yang mempengaruhi penerimaan asuransi pertanian, 
dan keinginan petani untuk membayar premi terkait program pemerintah asuransi pertanian 
untuk petani padi. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa 80% dari 50 responden petani yang dipilih 
secara acak menerima asuransi pertanian. Faktor-faktor positif yang memengaruhi penerimaan 
asuransi pertanian adalah pengalaman pada pertanian padi dan pendapatan dari pertanian 
padi. Faktor-faktor lain yang dipertimbangkan dalam model logistik tidak signifikan secara 
statistik. Faktor-faktor tersebut adalah usia petani, pendidikan, pendapatan dari usahatani 
padi, pengalaman bertani padi, ukuran lahan produksi beras, ukuran keluarga, dan pengalaman 
mengakses asuransi lain sebelumnya. Selain itu, keinginan petani padi untuk membayar premi 
asuransi pertanian rata-rata adalah Rp35.113 per hektar. Jumlah ini diperoleh dari 40 responden 
yang menerima program asuransi pertanian dari pemerintah.
Kata kunci: asuransi pertanian, premium, kemauan membayar, analisis logistik, statistik 
deskriptif
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INTRODUCTION  
Risk and uncertainty are one of the major issues in 
agricultural development. Ray (1981) classified the 
agricultural risks into natural risk, social risk, and 
economic risk. Natural risks include climate changes, 
pests and disease attacks, and other natural hazards. 
Social risks are defined as the factors that affect 
agricultural production negatively, such as changing in 
social structures which weaken agricultural resources, 
social conflicts, and other related factors. Finally, 
economic risks are the risks in agricultural production 
due to the effect of economic factors such as price 
fluctuations, decreased public or private investment in 
agriculture, and other factors. 
The discussion of risk and uncertainty problem in 
agriculture then can be addressed through the behavior 
of managing the risk and uncertainty and/ or addressing 
the way how to cope with the catastrophic effect of 
risk and uncertainty in sustainable farming of small 
scale farmers. Agricultural insurance is one of the 
alternatives considered as the solution for coping 
with the catastrophic effect of risk and uncertainty in 
agricultural production. Small-scale farming and low 
income farmers in developing countries, such as those 
in Indonesia, is one of those that are exposed to a lot of 
agricultural insurance. 
Pasaribu (2010) found that agricultural insurance 
has been widely used in many countries as a form of 
government intervention in preventing farmers from 
significant losses in their production due to pests and 
disease attacks, climate changes and other factors 
influencing negatively in their farming productions. 
Moreover, agricultural insurance is also a means of 
government to boost production and give more certainty 
in their resource allocations and productions. In this 
perspective, the agricultural insurance will complete 
another government intervention in agricultural 
development such as input subsidies and farmers’ 
institutional development.
Considering some experience in China, Wang et al. 
(2010) found that there are four prerequisites for 
running agricultural insurance successfully, i.e. (1) 
enough participation of farmers in accessing agricultural 
insurance, (2) appropriate rate of premium applied in 
the agricultural insurance, (3) data base of farming for 
determining appropriate probabilities of the risk and 
risk premium, and (4) the analysis for determining 
actuarially fair of premium rate applied. Experience 
from China regarding agricultural insurance also 
showed that the participation of farmers in agricultural 
insurance was low, which was 1–2% of farmers. Wang 
promoted the idea for increasing farmer’s participation 
through the variation of rate premium and its coverage. 
This scenario gives the farmers an alternative about 
which coverage and premium rate is preferred to be 
bought by farmers. Data is also important information 
for proving whether the probability of bad state is high 
or not. Therefore, the level of actuarially fair premium 
will be different regarding the probability of the risk 
that happened. 
Garrindo and Zilberman (2008) informed the 
development of agricultural insurance in Spain as a 
developed country implementing agricultural insurance 
along with other OECD countries, such as United State 
and Canada, was influenced by some factors, such 
as premium subsidies, direct payments, and products 
price volatility. Risk aversion is also the primary factor 
in stimulating farmers to buy agricultural insurance. 
This study also found that the larger probability of 
having production failure was not associated with 
more frequent insurance participation. This gives more 
understanding that farmers in Spain especially prefer 
developing self-insured mechanism by managing risk 
and giving more opportunity to avoid it strategically. 
Farmers’ expectation regarding premium and their 
involvement in agricultural insurance is relatively 
high, and it becomes a challenge for the government 
to make sure that the agricultural insurance program is 
conducted effectively and can give benefits as expected 
by farmers. Furthermore, the results inform that 
adverse selection is not the primary factor regarding 
the agricultural insurance participation as the high loss 
ratio was not convincingly related to the insurance 
participation. Finally, farmers will be maintained to 
buy agricultural insurance if they still have nonzero 
probabilities of obtaining indemnities in the long run.
This research attempts to reveal the farmers’ 
preference regarding the agricultural insurance in the 
research location and to give information regarding 
the characteristics of farmers that accept agricultural 
insurance for maintaining sustainability of their 
agricultural production and livelihood. Moreover, 
through the interview guided by structured questions 
in the questionnaire, this research also reveals the 
farmers’ willingness to pay the premium regarding rice 
farming.  
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METHODS
This research was conducted in Mangunrejo Village, 
Kepanjen District, Malang Regency, East Java 
Province, Indonesia. Moreover, the data was collected 
from survey from March to April 2017. 
  
The data were collected from a face-to-face interview 
using questionnaires. Simple random sampling is 
applied to determine the sample size. The number of 
sample taken for this research based on the formula 
promoted by Parel et al. (1978) is as follows:
n=  (N.Z2.S2)/(N.d2+Z2.S2)
Where: N (number of population); n (sample size); σ2 
(population variance of primary variable considered); 
d (the level of error accepted in the estimation); Z 
(Normal distribution of selected significant level).
Having 371 of rice farmers in the village, 1.96 of Z at 
5% significant level, the estimated variance of land is 
0.025 hectare, and maximum error accepted is 5%, the 
result of sample size is around 50 respondents.  
This research is observing the farmers’ behavior 
regarding agricultural insurance promoted by the 
government. Accessing the insurance means that the 
farmers tend to become risk averse more than risk 
neutral. This will be confirmed by the direct statement 
of the farmers whether he/she will buy the premium 
of insurance or not after having got explanation about 
the rules of the insurance offered. First, a farmer who 
wants to access the insurance should be a member of 
the farmers’ group. Second, the government will inform 
the coverage per hectare, which is based on average 
of existing or actual costs per hectare, and the farmer 
should provide the information regarding the previous 
year production. Third, the farmer will get indemnity 
insurance, which is equal to the cost spent on average 
costs regarding the land used for rice production if 
there is loss more than 75%. Fourth, in order to get 
indemnity insurance the farmer should pay premium for 
that coverage. Under this insurance design, the farmer 
will reveal his preference for accessing the agricultural 
insurance. 
After we get information about whether the respondents 
prefer the insurance or not, this information will be used 
to develop logistic model of the farmers’ preference 
regarding the agricultural insurance. The model is 
presented below.
L = ln(p1/(1-p1)) 
= β0 + β1.AGE + β2.EDU + β3.INC+β4.EXP +  
   β5.LAND + β6.F_MEM + β7.D1
Where AGE is the age of farmer respondent (years), 
EDU is education of head of family (years), INC is 
income for rice farming (IDR), EXP is experience in 
rice farming (years), LAND is the land size of rice 
production (hectare), F_MEM is family members 
(person), and D1=1 if there is an experience of accessing 
insurance and D1=0 if there is no experience of it.
The dominant theory explaining about risk-taking 
decisions is developed by Morgenstein and Neumann 
(1953). The representation of decision making in 
risk conditions is by maximizing the expected utility 
rather than maximizing profit. This concept consists 
of 3 components, namely expected outcomes, the 
tendency of outcomes that are indicated by probability 
distribution, and the existence of utility over outcomes 
(Hurley, 2010). Furthermore, Rothchild and Stiglitz 
(1970) provides an analysis of which options are riskier 
than others. This concept is also known as stochastic 
dominance (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). For the risk-
aversion person, the first stochastic dominance says 
that the lower variance of the alternative at the same 
average level is preferred than the higher one (Vickson, 
1977).  
Farmers are working in an uncertain condition and 
facing risk and uncertain output due to the facts that 
agricultural productions depend on weather, biological 
process, and the environment. Therefore, the bad 
state as well as good state of production exists in 
their production activities. Generally, the risk and 
uncertainty facing by farmers can be reduced by the 
farmers’ experience and capability of understanding the 
weather and controlling the use of available resources. 
However, the availability of inputs and the market are 
not easily predicted, and these can affect the livelihood 
of farmers not only in the sort term but also in the long-
run. The failure of production seems to easily shut down 
the next production and pushes the farmers’ family into 
poverty. This generally happens to small scale farmers 
in the rural areas. 
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Representing the risk and uncertainty and the 
importance of covering the farmers’ losses through 
insurance can be depicted as follows. The person who 
is uninsured will face uncertainty results whether he/
she will get a good thing or bad thing of his/her wealth. 
Then, the corresponding utility function is U1. For 
insured person, he/she will face certainty regardless 
what occurrence will happen and the utility function is 
U2 (Figure 1).   
Suppose that the individual is at risk averse and the 
probability of good state happening is P; then, there 
are two points, A and B, which have the same expected 
value of wealth; however, point A is the expected value 
with the risk and point B is the expected value without 
the risk. Since the person is at risk averse, he/she will 
prefer B than A. Therefore, the utility function of B is 
higher than that of A. Moreover, the risk averse person 
will sacrifice (A1-B1) of his/her wealth in order to 
avoid the risk. That value is called risk premium. If the 
person is at risk neutral, which means that the person 
does not consider risk in his/her decision, then point 
A and point B are the same in his/her utility. In other 
words, he/she is not willing to pay the insurance.
RESULTS
The characteristics of farmers regarding the age, family 
members, education, income from rice production, 
experience of rice farming, and land size of rice 
farming are shown in Table 1. Sixty-four% of farmers 
age more than 55 years. Most of them graduated from 
elementary school or less, i.e. about 62%, and the 
actual gross income from rice farming is generally in 
the range between IDR 1.0 million and 4.9 million. On 
average, the farmers’ land size in the research location 
is 0.28 hectare and the standard deviation is about 0.14 
hectare. Moreover, the farmers’ experience regarding 
rice farming is more than 10 years. 
Those are the picture of the farmers in the research 
sample, which are relatively low in education and 
low in land size (0.28 hectare on average). Having 
those constraints will make farmers in risky situation. 
The implication of these limited resources will threat 
sustainability of farmers’ paddy production. It means 
that the absence of government intervention and the 
farmers’ low education will cause catastrophic problem 
to them and their families.
Table 1. The respondents’ characteristics
Characteristics Category
Number 
of farmers 
(Person)
Percentage 
(%)
Age 35–44 6 12
45–54 12 24
55–64 20 40
≥ 65 12 24
Family 
members
1–3 20 40
4–6 30 60
≥ 7 0 0
Education No education 3 6
Not finished 
Elementary
7 14
Elementary 21 42
Junior high 
school
7 14
Senior high 
school
8 16
Higher 
education
4 8
Income 
offarmers in 
acrual size 
ofland (IDR)
< 1.000.000 0 0
1.000.000 – 
< 2.400.000
29 58
2.400.000–
< 4.900.000
20 40
4.900.000 –
< 1.400.ooo
1 2
>7.400.000 0 0
Land size 
(hectare)
< 0.2 16 32
0.2 – <0.3 19 38
0.3 – <0.4 2 4
0.4 – <0.S 13 26
Experience ≤ 10 5 10
11–20 21 42
21–30 11 22
31–40 12 24
> 40 1 2
Figure 1. Insured and un-insured utility level of wealth 
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Noticing the years of experience of paddy farmers 
in Table 1 and the resources own by farmers, there 
are signals that farmers are not making progress in 
their paddy production. The farmers’ more than 10 
years experience in producing paddy in their fields 
and potential profit are not good enough for capital 
accumulation. As a result, the farmers’ resources 
are getting lower and threatening their livelihood 
sustainability in paddy production. Therefore, the 
agricultural insurance supported by the government 
is one way of preventing them from coming into the 
shutting down point in their farming. With regard to the 
agricultural insurance, the acceptance of the insurance 
is studied using quantitative approach, logit analysis.
Logit analysis is applied in order to generate information 
regarding the acceptance of farmers toward agricultural 
insurance program run by the government. The data 
were analyzed using SPSS 21. The results show that 
the Negelkerke R-Square of the logit model is 0.57. 
It means that the variables in the model explain 57% 
the farmers’ acceptance of agricultural insurance. 
The overall correct predicted value of accepting the 
agricultural insurance is 90%. Moreover, the predicted 
probability based on logit analysis comparing to income 
from paddy farming and land size is presented below.
It is a relatively clear pattern of the correlation between 
income level and the acceptance of the agricultural 
insurance. The farmer who has more income in 
their paddy farming has more acceptance level in 
the agricultural insurance. This finding supports the 
assumption that higher income farmers tend to be more 
risk averse.   
The acceptance level of agricultural insurance is 
different if it is connected to the farming size. The 
increasing level of farming size does not clearly show 
the increasing acceptance in the agricultural insurance. 
Figure 2 shows the pattern of both agricultural insurance 
acceptance to income level and agricultural insurance 
acceptance to farming size.
Continuing the analysis of logit model regarding the 
characteristics of socio-economic toward agricultural 
insurance, the results show that the factors significantly 
and positively affecting the level of acceptance toward 
agricultural insurance are income of rice farming and 
the experience in rice farming. Age, education, farming 
size, family members or family size, and the experience 
in buying health insurance are not statistically significant 
to foster the farmers to join the agricultural insurance 
program. 
The finding regarding the income and the agricultural 
insurance acceptance in this research is supported by 
the finding of Farzaneh et al. (2017), which found that 
acceptance toward silkworm insurance are affected by 
the higher level of income and the small distance of 
insurance affiliates from the silk farms. Along with those 
factors is the fair premium level paid by the farmers. 
Furthermore, Sihem (2017) using logistic regression 
of 276 cross-section observations of agricultural 
insurance in American and European countries in the 
period 2000–2012 found a different result compared 
to this research result regarding the effect of education 
on the agricultural insurance acceptance. Sihem found 
that education played an important role in affecting 
demand of agricultural insurance. The other factors 
affecting the demand of agricultural insurance were the 
government subsidy on premium paid, the yield risk, 
and also the religion. For other findings related to the 
developmental factors of agricultural insurance, Yang 
et al. (2015) observed that the agricultural insurance 
development in China was significantly influenced by 
the government subsidy in the premium. Other factors 
that positively significantly influenced the participation 
to agricultural insurance were diversity of crop 
production disaster, the level of farmers’ awareness 
toward agricultural insurance, and the weather factor. 
However, diversity of income negatively impacted 
on the farmers’ participation for buying agricultural 
insurance. 
According to the table, a number of farmers accept the 
agricultural insurance, and they are willing to pay the 
premium about IDR 35,113, and the coefficient variation 
is 21%. The pilot project of agricultural insurance has 
been run by the government since 2014 determined the 
premium level of IDR36,000 (20%) paid by farmers 
and IDR144,000 (80%) paid by government. This is 
coming from 40 respondents in the research location, 
while the others, i.e. 10 respondents, are not willing to 
pay premium for agricultural insurance at all.   
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Managerial Implications
Managerial implications of these finding can be viewed 
from the perspective of farmers and government. From 
the farmers’ perspective, the risk and uncertainty 
in rice farming will affect more in the way how the 
higher income farmer allocate their resources. Using 
Rothchild (1970) concept, the farmers who have higher 
income tend to use more inputs, such as pesticides, to 
protect their farming from losses. However, it is not 
clearly related to farming size, as explained in logit 
result. The existence of agricultural insurance will 
tend to be more acceptable for the higher income 
rice farmers. Government, on the other hand, could 
not promote insurance program for all farmers. The 
progressive farmers are potential in accepting this 
program; however, general farmers with lower income 
and experiences will not participate actively and 
continuously in agricultural insurance program.
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
Farmers’ acceptance toward agricultural insurance is 
relatively high, which is 80%. However, the indemnity 
offered for the agricultural insurance in this research 
is higher from what has been offered by government 
through the pilot project conducted in East-Java and 
other province in Indonesia. The government offers 
indemnity about IDR6 million for 1 hectare as the 
assumption of the cost per hectare paddy production. 
In this research, the determination of coverage level is 
based on the average actual cost of rice production in 
the location, which is on average IDR7.18 million per 
hectare (explicit cost spent for rice farming), which is 
higher than what have been offered by government. 
Logit analysis giving information related to the 
characteristic of farmers who have higher possibility 
in accepting agricultural insurances. The characters of 
farmers supporting the agricultural insurance program 
are having higher income and higher experiences. Those 
characters can be simplified as progressive farmers. 
Considering willingness to pay of farmers, the amount 
of premium willing to be paid by farmers is little bit 
lower than the part of premium paid by farmers under 
agricultural insurance program. Government supports 
80% of the premium. The actual total premium is 
IDR180,000.  It means that if the government support 
of this program is stopped then the farmers will not pay 
the premium or will not buy the insurance because the 
willingness to pay of the premium is much lower than 
the total actual premium.  
Recommendations
Considering the conclusion and the facts regarding 
the implementation of agricultural insurance, some 
suggestions can be made for the development of 
agricultural insurance in Indonesia. They are:
1. For strengthening the program in the future, 
progressive farmers tend to favor the agricultural 
insurance program. For this type of farmers, the 
program should be addressed first. This will increase 
the success of the program. As a result, other farmers 
could learn and imitate these farmers in accepting 
the agricultural insurance program.
2. The coverage of insurance is adjusted to what the 
cost of farming in specific location. The acceptability 
Figure 2. The pattern of farming size, the income and the acceptance probabilities in the agricultural insurance
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of agricultural insurance tends to increase when the 
program can differentiate which location has higher 
risk and which location has lower one. Higher risk 
will generate higher premium and lower risk will 
imply lower rate of premium as well.  
3. As stated in the Bayes’ theorem, government should 
provide lower transaction cost in accessing insurance 
coverage. Therefore, the benefit gaining from the 
agricultural insurance program can increase the 
posterior believe of farmers regarding the insurance 
program.
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